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Some ReflectionS on RemedieS in AdminiStRAtive lAw
■
Professor Johannes Chan SC*
This article argues that some of the existing procedural requirements in traditional 
judicial review proceedings will have to be modified in light of the increasing 
number of challenges against constitutionality of legislation. It also argues for a 
more flexible approach to the granting of declaratory relief and damages in judicial 
review, and while it advocates in favour of a power to grant a stay of a declaration 
of unconstitutionality of legislation, it queries whether such an approach has been 
adopted in practice. 
Introduction
With the introduction of the Bill of Rights in 1991 and the Basic Law in 
1997, the demarcation between constitutional law and traditional judi-
cial review in administrative law has become increasingly blurred. In one 
sense, a challenge against an administrative decision for being contrary to 
the Basic Law is nothing more than an application of the doctrine of ultra 
vires under traditional judicial review. Yet the possibility of challenging the 
vires of the enabling legislation has considerably widened the scope of ju-
dicial review, as an administrative decision can be challenged, not just by 
attacking the decision itself, but also by attacking the vires of the source of 
powers. This possibility presents new challenges to the judiciary in granting 
remedies, as the consequences and implications could be much far-reach-
ing. At the same time, the trend of combining constitutional challenges in 
traditional judicial review applications raises the question of to what extent 
the existing procedure for judicial review is able to meet this new challenge.
Apart from the ability of the judicial review procedure to meet the new 
constitutional challenges, this article also explores the extent to which the 
court could make prospective rulings or suspend the operation of its decla-
rations, and how far the court can order damages against a third party.
* Dean, University of Hong Kong. An earlier version of this paper has been presented in the Confer-
ence on Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance in December 2008. The 
author would also like to acknowledge the very helpful comments of the anonymous reviewer of 
this article.
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Adequacy of Judicial Review Procedure
In Leung v Secretary for Justice, the applicant challenged by judicial review 
the constitutionality of certain sexual offences which were said to be dis-
criminatory against homosexuals.1 The Respondent took procedural points 
that no judgment, order, decision or other proceedings had been identified 
for challenge; that the applicant did not have sufficient interest to bring the 
judicial review; and that there was undue delay in bringing the application. 
Any of these grounds would allow the court to exercise its discretion to re-
fuse the application. 
On the first point, the court held that the requirement of identifying 
a judgment, order, decision or other proceedings was a matter of form, in 
which there was considerable flexibility.2 It is understandably difficult to 
identify a judgment, order or decision when the challenge is on the legality 
of the legislative provision. An artificial decision that could be identi-
fied would be the assent of the Chief Executive to the bill which has been 
passed by the Legislative Council,3 but this is rather artificial and challenges 
to assent to a bill have not prospered in other jurisdictions.4 At the same 
time, focusing on the assent would create great difficulty on the question 
of delay, especially when the challenges on constitutionality of the legisla-
tion are brought well after the bill has become law. Yet without a decision, 
it is not easy to determine when time begins to run. In the Leung case, the 
criminal sanction may apply when the Applicant turned 16, but his judi-
cial review was only lodged four years later. The court eventually decided 
that, provided that the point was arguable and the applicant had sufficient 
interest, the time factor, whilst relevant, was nevertheless not as compel-
ling a consideration as in other situations and, accordingly, it dismissed the 
relevance of delay in this context. While the flexible approach of the court 
is to be commended, it does highlight the problem of applying the existing 
procedural requirements that are designed for challenging an administrative 
decision to a challenge against the constitutionality of a statutory provision. 
It is clear that the identification of a specific order, judgment, decision or 
proceedings and the requirement of bringing the application without delay 
have to be modified for this type of application. Under the revised Order 
53 rule 1A of the Rules of High Court, which came into effect on 2 April 
1 [2006] 4 HKLRD 211.
2 The court also seems to suggest that there is no statutory requirement to identify a judgment, or-
der, decision or other proceedings. This is doubtful, as Ord 53 r 3(2) requires the proceedings to be 
commenced in the statutory form – Form 86A – which refers to the “judgment, order, decision or 
other proceeding in respect of which relief is sought”.
3 This was suggested by V.P. Litton in Lee Miu Ling v Att Gen (1995) 5 HKPLR 585 at 596.
4 Westco Lagan Ltd v Att Gen [2001] 1 NZLR 40; Boscawen v Att Gen [2008] NZHC 949.
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2009, it is now possible to challenge the lawfulness of a legislative enact-
ment. The amendment, however, does not address the problem of delay and 
when time begins to run in the case of such a challenge.5
Declaration and Future Conduct
Another issue raised by the Leung case is how far the court can grant a 
declaration in the absence of any lis between the parties. It is axiomatic in 
the common law system that a court will not entertain a hypothetical or 
academic question in the sense that there are no events that have occurred 
that form the basis for the question to be answered.6 The court exists to 
resolve a real, not an imaginary, dispute, and it is considered undesirable or 
even dangerous for a court to engage in giving advisory opinion in the ab-
stract.
Notwithstanding this general principle, the court is increasingly pre-
pared to determine a question even when the lis has disappeared, provided 
that there is good reason in the public interest to do so.7 This is said to be 
a matter of discretion, not of jurisdiction.8 The absence of a lis would in 
most cases also give rise to issues concerning justiciability, standing or even 
jurisdiction. Thus, in Lee Miu Ling,9 the Court of Appeal rejected the ap-
plicant’s challenge against the constitutionality of functional constituency 
partly on the ground that the applicant, not being a member of any func-
tional constituency, had no standing or interest to challenge the inequality 
of voting power in different functional constituencies. This part of the deci-
sion could easily be justified as posing a hypothetical question. On the other 
hand, while the questions of hypothetical issues, standing or jurisdiction are 
often inextricably linked and substantially overlapped, they may sometimes 
require different considerations and approaching the matter from one per-
spective such as standing, as shown below, may sometimes cloud the real 
issue to be determined.
5 The amended statutory form in Appendix 1 of the Rules of the High Court still requires the party 
to identify the “judgment, order, decision or other proceeding in respect of which relief is sought”.
6 See, eg, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Wynee [1993] 1 WLR 115 at 119–120 
where Goff LJ said that “it is well established that this House does not decide hypothetical ques-
tions.” See also Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 at 194, 
per Bridge LJ and Ainsbury v Millington [1987] 1 WLR 379 at 381 where Bridge LJ remarked that 
“it has always been a fundamental feature of our judicial system that the courts decide disputes 
between the parties before them; they do not pronounce on abstract questions of law when there 
is no dispute to be resolved.” Note that the absence of a lis is sometimes addressed as an issue on 
justiciability or lack of standing: see Lee Miu Ling v Att Gen (1995) 5 HKPLR 585, n 9 below.
7 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Salem [1999] 1 AC 450 at 457A-B, per Slynn LJ.
8 Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211 at 228A-C, para 28(8), per Ma CJHC.
9 Lee Miu Ling v Att Gen (1995) 5 HKPLR 585 at 595.
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In Chit Fai Motors Co Ltd v Commissioner for Transport,10 the applicant 
was a commercial operator of public light bus that was licensed to run a 
number of fixed routes in Hong Kong. It complained against a decision of 
the Commissioner for Transport approving the operation of a free bus ser-
vice between a major shopping centre and various nearby residential areas 
on the ground that this had materially and adversely affected its business 
and that the decision of approval was made without consultation of the 
applicant. It sought a declaration that the Commissioner was under a duty 
to consult the applicant on this kind of decision, but the application was 
dismissed at first instance on the ground that by the time of the hearing, 
the approval to run the free bus service had already expired. This decision 
was reversed on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that while the decision 
being challenged was a one-off decision, it was clear that the dispute was 
an ongoing and real one as there appeared to be other decisions involving 
the provision of free bus service that might affect the applicant. In deter-
mining whether or not to exercise its discretion to make a declaration, the 
court would closely examine the relevance or utility of any decision. In this 
regard, the court held that this would be easier to demonstrate in the public 
law sphere, as “very often in public or administrative law cases, the duties of 
public bodies fall to be exercised on a continuing basis not only in relation 
to the parties before the court but also perhaps to others in the future.”11
The point was re-visited in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal 
in Leung v Secretary for Justice. The applicant, who challenged the constitu-
tionality of certain sexual offences that were targeted at homosexuals, was 
not charged with any offence in that case. The respondent argued that the 
application was purely academic, alongside other procedural challenges.
The court reaffirmed that it could grant declaratory relief relating to fu-
ture conduct which may or may not happen, although it would do so only 
in exceptional circumstances.12 These circumstances would include, as in 
that case, a situation that access to justice could only be achieved by trans-
gressing the law,13 or when it is undesirable or prejudicial to force interested 
parties to adopt a wait and see attitude before dealing with the matter.14 In 
that particular case, the court took into account that the applicant, being 
10 [2004] 1 HKC 465.
11 Ibid, p 472, para 20(3), per Ma CJHC.
12 See also R (Pretty) v DDP & Secretary of State for the Home Department (Intervener) [2002] 1 AC 
800 at 851, para 116, per Hobhouse LJ; R (Rusbridger) v Att Gen [2004] 1 AC 357 at 366–367, pa-
ras 16–19, per Steyn LJ, and at 370, para 32, per Hutton LJ; NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, at 
862–863, per Goff LJ.
13 [2006] 4 HKLRD 211 at 227, para 27(5).
14 Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board [1972] AC 342 at 347; Gillick v West Norfolk 
& Wosbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v Att Gen of Hong 
Kong [1970] AC 1136.
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a homosexual, had been living under a cloud of uncertainty, not knowing 
whether and when he would be prosecuted, and that he could only test 
it by committing the criminal offence of buggery or gross indecency, the 
constitutionality of which was the subject matter of his challenge. His life 
has been seriously affected by the legislation, and the application involved 
largely a matter of law the determination of which was not fact-sensitive. 
It also involved a most intimate part of personal privacy. There was un-
doubted public interest and the issue potentially affected a large number of 
people. Accordingly, the court granted a declaration that the statutory of-
fences in question contravened the right to privacy and equality under the 
Basic Law and the Bill of Rights.
While this is a welcomed decision, the court seemed to suggest that this 
is a matter of standing. This seems to be a rather artificial way of approach-
ing the matter. The difficulty for the court is that it is trying hard to fit the 
application for review of constitutionality into the traditional procedural 
requirements of judicial review in terms of forms, interests and delay. The 
case highlights that the existing procedure for judicial review is not entirely 
suitable for review of constitutionality of legislation, which is an increas-
ingly common feature in judicial review applications. As the court is right 
in pointing out that this is not a matter of jurisdiction but one of discretion, 
a better approach is to treat the matter as one of relief. Once the court is 
satisfied that the applicant has sufficient standing, which is usually not a 
problem, it is better to approach the application as one whether the court 
should exercise its discretion to grant declaratory or other relief. The dis-
cretion may be exercised when a discrete point of statutory construction 
arises which does not depend on specific facts, or when there are a number 
of conflicting decisions,15 or where a large number of similar cases exist or 
are anticipated so that the issue will most likely have to be resolved in the 
near future,16 or where the same issue is likely to arise as between the same 
parties,17 or when access to justice could only be achieved by transgressing 
the law.18 
The courts are also right in emphasising that a declaratory relief in rela-
tion to future conduct will only be granted in exceptional circumstances. 
15 R v Birmingham City Juvenile Court Ex p Birmingham City Council [1988] 1 WLR 337.
16 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Salem [1999] 1 AC 450 at 457A–B, per Lord 
Slynn.
17 R v Canons Park Mental Health Review Tribunal Ex p A [1995] QB 60; Chit Fai Motors Co Ltd v 
Commissioner for Transport [2004] 1 HKC 465. In Eastham v Newcastle United Football lub Ltd [1964] 
Ch 413, the court was prepared to determine the validity of a restraint of trade clause in the Eng-
lish Football Leagues restricting the transfer of a football player from one club to another when 
the player in question had already moved from his former club (Newcastle) to Arsenal on the basis 
that this issue was likely to arise in relation to other players.
18 Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211.
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At the same time, the courts are less resistant to invoke this exceptional 
jurisdiction in recent years, and have pointed out that advisory declarations 
are “valuable tools to reduce the danger of administrative activities being 
declared illegal retrospectively and to assist public” (sic).19 Given that de-
claratory relief is available in both private law and public law, the nature of 
the issue in question may also be relevant in determining whether to exer-
cise the discretion to grant declaratory relief in relation to future conduct 
only. The court should be more ready to entertain an application in the 
public law context when constitutionality of legislation is in issue, as Ma 
CJHC put it, “if a law is unconstitutional, the sooner this is discovered, the 
better.”20
Suspension of Declaratory Relief
A different scenario is that the court is prepared to grant a declaratory re-
lief, but the consequences may be such that it would be inappropriate to 
allow the declaratory relief to take effect immediately. It is well known that 
the court can take into account the demand of good public administration 
in determining whether to exercise its discretion to grant remedies in judi-
cial review.21 How far can a court allow an executive act to take legal effect 
when it is based on a statutory provision that the court has concluded to be 
unconstitutional? This question arose in Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive.22 For 
many years, the Government had relied upon section 33 of the Telecom-
munications Ordinance for conducting covert surveillance. This section 
was heavily criticised for its excessive breadth.23 A private member bill was 
introduced in 1997 to amend this section against the will of the Govern-
ment, and the Government refused to bring the amendment into force. 
It was only when the courts refused to admit evidence obtained by covert 
surveillance in some criminal cases that the Government was prepared to 
introduce, by way of an Executive Order, a tightened authorisation and re-
view procedure. 24 Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal 
found section 33 a violation of the right to private communication under 
19 (CND) v The Prime Minister of the UK [2002] EWHC 2777 (admin) at para 46.
20 Ibid, at 230, para 30.
21 R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission Ex p Argyll Group plc [1986] 1 WLR 763; Caswell v Dairy 
Produce Quota Tribunal [1990] 2 AC 738.
22 (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441.
23 See, eg, Law Reform Commission, Privacy: Regulation of Interception of Communications (Dec 1996), 
paras 2.20–2.24, 3.43–3.46. 
24 Secretary for Justice v Shum Chiu [2006] HKEC 2335. See also HKSAR v Chan Kau Tai [2006] 1 
HKLRD 400 and HKSAR v Mo Yuk Ping [2005] HKEC 1318; HKSAR v Li Man Tak [2005] HKEC 
1309.
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Article 30 of the Basic Law. While the Executive Order prescribing a new 
procedure was an improvement over the old regime, it was not in accor-
dance with “legal procedures” as required by Article 30. The Government 
argued that if section 33 and the Executive Order were declared uncon-
stitutional, the law enforcement agencies would immediately be left with 
no power to conduct or continue covert surveillance and there would be 
disastrous consequences on the maintenance of law and order. As a result, 
the Court of First Instance (and affirmed by the Court of Appeal) granted 
an order of temporary validity so that section 33 and the Executive Order 
remained valid with legal effect for a period of six months so as to afford the 
Government time to introduce remedial legislation. On further appeal, the 
Court of Final Appeal set aside the temporary validity order and replaced it 
with an order to suspend the declaration of inconsistency for the same pe-
riod of time. 
The decision is controversial in two respects. First, it is unclear on what 
basis can a court claim to have jurisdiction to suspend a declaration or to 
grant a temporary validity order? Secondly, when could the court ever jus-
tify upholding the validity of a legislative provision, even temporarily, when 
it has unequivocally found the provision to be unconstitutional? 
Hartmann J (as he then was) rested his decision on a general notion of the 
rule of law. He referred to a number of cases from the Federal Court of Paki-
stan, the Canadian Supreme Court and the House of Lords, and notably Re 
Manitoba Language Rights25 where the Canadian Supreme Court, after hold-
ing that all laws in Manitoba were unconstitutional as they failed to provide 
both official languages versions, was prepared nonetheless to deem these 
legislations valid and to grant the Government a period of five years to 
translate and re-enact all necessary legislation. Hartmann J held that when 
the very fabric of the rule of law was threatened, the court would have the 
power to avoid a situation where there would be no rule of law. This is a 
rather sweeping and vague formulation which did not really provide any 
useful guidance. Given the exceptional nature of this power, it is better 
that the circumstances and the need for the exercise of such power be more 
specifically defined. Instead of relying on a general notion of the rule of law 
to confer temporary validity, the Court of Final Appeal was prepared to 
rely on an inherent jurisdiction, arguing that “the power to suspend a dec-
laration is a concomitant of power to make the declaration”.26 The Court 
drew a distinction between temporary validity and suspension, which, as 
argued below, is a dubious distinction. It suggested that temporary validity 
25 [1985] 1 SCR 721; (1995) 19 DLR (4th) 1.
26 See Bokhary PJ, at 456, paras 32–34. See also Bokhary PJ, “The First Decade of the Basic Law – A 
Judicial Perspective” (2007) 15(2) Asia Pacific Law Review 125, p 133. 
09_Analysis.indd   327 10/15/09   8:07:38 PM
328 Johannes Chan SC (2009) HKLJ
should be reserved for situations when there was a virtual legal vacuum or 
a virtually blank statutory book,27 which was not the situation in that case. 
This left the issue of suspension, and the Court asserted that there was an 
inherent jurisdiction to suspend a declaration. While this seems to provide 
a better jurisdictional basis than a vague notion of the rule of law for the 
exercise of this power, there is no consideration other than a self-serving 
statement if such “inherent jurisdiction” exists in the first place.
Another way of approaching this issue is to ask if the court can exercise 
a power of prospective overruling, ie, imposing a temporal restriction on its 
order so that it would only apply prospectively.28 A purely prospective order 
does not make practical sense, as the applicant in the case must be seeking 
relief in relation to certain acts that took place in the past. To this extent it 
may be more accurate to describe it as a “modified prospective application”, 
namely, that the order will apply prospectively except that it will apply to 
the immediate parties to the proceedings and, perhaps, parties in other cases 
that are pending the resolution of the subject proceeding.29 Whether there 
is jurisdiction to make a prospective or modified prospective order is con-
troversial.30 In some jurisdictions, such as South Africa or Scotland, there is 
an express power in the constitutional instrument to limit the retrospective 
application of a declaration of inconsistency.31 Short of an express statutory 
power, the starting point is that judgments would always have retrospective 
and prospective effect, as the court in any judicial decision must necessarily 
be deciding on the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to events 
that happened before the action was brought to the court.32 It was said that 
the court would be usurping a legislative power if it could declare what the 
law was yesterday and what the law is as from today or will be at some time 
in the future.33 The High Court of Australia drew a distinction between 
adjudication of rights, which was the proper role of a court, and creation of 
27 Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441 at 456, para 34.
28 It can be argued that prospective overruling is more drastic than suspension of declaratory relief, as 
the latter declaration will still take immediate effect with a temporal limit, whereas a prospective 
ruling will only take effective some time in the future. As argued below, such a distinction, if it 
ever exists, has probably no practical consequences. 
29 HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa [2006] HKEC 183, para 12 (CA). See also Dame Mary Arden, “Prospective 
Overruling” (2004) 120 LQR 7. It may also benefit those who are still in time to lodge an appeal.
30 It may be noted that this issue is sometimes disguised under the notion of various theories of inva-
lidity, and the general trend, including Hong Kong, is to move away from the use of the concept of 
nullity.
31 See Scotland Act 1998, s 102, and the Constitution of South Africa. Similarly, such a power ex-
ists under the Indian Constitution. A good summary was provided by Stock JA in HKSAR v Hung 
Chan Wa [2006] HKEC 183, at [28]–[29].
32 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln County Council [1999] 2 AC 349; Lau Kwong Yung v Director of Im-
migration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300 at 326.
33 Lord Reid, ”The Judge as Law Maker” (1972–73) 12 JSPTL 22, 23; R v Governor of Brockhill Prison 
Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19 at 48, per Lord Hobhouse.
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rights, which fell outside the remit of the court. It held that the court has 
no inherent jurisdiction to make a prospective order, holding that it would 
be a perversion of judicial power to maintain in force unconstitutional law, 
especially when non-compliance with the unconstitutional law exposed 
one to criminal prosecution.34 
In contrast, while Lord Goff suggested barely 10 years ago that prospec-
tive overruling has no place in English legal system,35 the House of Lords 
recently held that such a power existed in all situations, but it could only 
be exercised in exceptional circumstances.36 It cautioned that this power 
could only be exercised “where a decision on an issue of law, whether com-
mon law or statute law, was unavoidable but the decision would have such 
gravely unfair and disruptive consequences for past transactions or hap-
penings that the House of Lords would be compelled to depart from the 
normal principles relating to the retrospective and prospective effect of 
court decisions.”37 The Canadian court denied such a power,38 but it was 
able to achieve a similar result in Re Manitoba Language Rights by invok-
ing the doctrine of necessity.39 In the United States, where this power is 
more enthusiastically invoked, there is a mixed record. The US experience 
was described by Lord Nicholls in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd as being “waxed 
and waned”, particularly in the context of criminal law when liberty of the 
subject is involved.40 The European Court of Human Rights also seems to 
accept such a power in order to avoid “re-opening legal practice or situ-
ations that antedate the delivery of its judgment.”41 In Hong Kong, the 
Court of Final Appeal appeared to accept that it has such an inherent pow-
er, although it has not made any firm decision in this regard.42 It recognised 
that this question might depend on the understanding and extent of sepa-
34 Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465 at 503–504 and 515. See also Boddington v British Trans-
port Police [1999] 2 AC 143 at 165; Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612 at 672–673.
35 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln County Council [1999] 2 AC 349 at 379. The existence of this power 
was also acknowledged by the House of Lords in R v Governor of Brockhill Prison Ex parte Evans (No 
2) [2001] 2 AC 19.
36 National Westminster Bank plc v Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680. It is of interest to note that 
this is a private law case. The power of prospective overruling has never been invoked since this 
case. It is also interesting to note that this case has escaped the attention of leading English works 
on judicial review and administrative law, such as Paul Craig, Administrative Law (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 6th edn) and Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edn, 2007).
37 [2005] 2 AC 680, at 699, para 40, per Lord Nicholls.
38 Edward and Edward (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 654.
39 (1985) 19 DLR (4th) 1.
40 [2005] 2 AC 680 at 693, paras 18–19. Prospective overruling was upheld in Linkletter v Walker, 381 
US 618 (1965), but its application to criminal law was restricted by Griffiths v Kentucky (1987) 107 
S Ct 708.
41 Marckx v Belgium, Series A, No 31; (1979) 2 EHRR 330 at 353. See also a similar approach adopted 
by the European Court of Justice: R (on the application of Bidar) v Ealing LBC (C-209/03).
42 HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614.
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ration of powers and the particular relations between the Legislature, the 
Executive and the Judiciary in different jurisdictions, and as a result, this 
was not a question that might yield to a common answer in different parts 
of the common law world. 
The existence of a power to make prospective overruling is ultimately a 
matter of achieving competing notions of justice. As it is familiar in admin-
istrative law, a court may sometimes refuse relief because no injustice has 
been done and the grant of relief would not be conducive to good adminis-
tration or would unfairly upset vested rights of third parties. Likewise, there 
must be cases where injustice would result if a declaration of invalidity is al-
lowed to operate retrospectively. Legal certainty is particularly important in 
private law matters such as land, contract or property. There may be unde-
sirable economic repercussions if decisions relying on a statutory provision 
which has since been declared unconstitutional would upset such decisions 
in the past.43 Likewise, if a legislative provision on divorce is struck down 
with retrospective effect, it may result in numerous cases of illegitimate 
births which are otherwise legitimate.44 In some of these cases, the principle 
that vested rights should not be affected may come to an aid to avoid such 
undesirable consequences, but this may not work in all cases, such as a situ-
ation when there would be a legal vacuum or extraordinary administrative 
dislocation as in Re Manitoba Language Rights or allegedly in Koo Siu Yiu. 
On the other hand, prospective overruling may cause injustice when liberty 
of the person is at risk. This is particularly the case when someone whose 
liberty is deprived of by an impugned legislative provision in a criminal 
process is denied the benefit of a declaration of unconstitutionality. This 
may have to be balanced against the desirability of finality in criminal 
law.45 There is also the legitimate concern that the courts may, in making 
prospective overruling, be engaged in a legislative rather than a judicial 
process. The reply is that the court is no more engaged in a legislative pro-
cess in prospective overruling than in striking down a legislative provision. 
If it is accepted that the court can legitimately strike down a legislative pro-
vision without being engaged in a legislative process, it cannot be said that 
the court is engaged in a legislative process if it holds that the legislation is 
only null and void in respect of its future operation. On the whole, balanc-
ing all these factors, it seems that the case for the existence of such a power 
to allow flexibility and to serve the ends of justice is overwhelming, so long 
43 Hill v Atlantic (1906).55 SR 854. 
44 Bingham v Miller (1848) 17 Ohio 445.
45 Compare R v Kwok Hing Man (1994) 4 HKPLR 186 and HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKC-
FAR 614. See also Nicholls LJ in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680 at 696, paras 26–27.
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as it is a power that could only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances 
and as last resort.
Even if such a power exists, its exercise may vary depending on the na-
ture of the issues involved. For instance, in statutory interpretation, under 
the declaratory theory, an interpretation by the judiciary will relate back to 
the time when the legislation was first enacted and therefore a prospective 
order in the context of statutory interpretation would not be appropriate.46 
Lord Steyn and Lord Scott held the same view in their dissenting judgment 
in this regard in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd.47 On the other hand, it was argued 
that the declaratory theory had no place when there was a new constitution 
under which previous law was adopted save to the extent of inconsistency 
with the new constitution. This is the situation under the Basic Law. Under 
Article 160 of the Basic Law, any pre-existing law that is discovered to be 
inconsistent with the Basic Law after the Basic Law has come into effect 
shall cease to have force. It was argued that the effect of any order of incon-
sistency could, as mandated by Article 160, only be prospective as from the 
date when the law was declared unconstitutional. It followed, as contended, 
that convictions made pursuant to a statutory provision before that statuto-
ry provision was held unconstitutional should not be affected by the court’s 
declaration of unconstitutionality. This argument was rightly rejected by 
the Court of Appeal as it would lead to illogical and absurd consequences. If 
Article 160 mandates prospective overruling, it creates an illogical distinc-
tion between pre-1997 and post-1997 laws. In any event, most legislative 
provisions that are inconsistent with the Basic Law will also be inconsistent 
with the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong, and will be repealed by the Bill 
of Rights Ordinance (if it was enacted before 1991) or prevented from com-
ing into force by the Letters Patent (if it was enacted after 1991). In either 
case, such impugned statutory provision would not form part of the pre-
1997 laws and would therefore not be adopted in the HKSAR. The Court 
of Final Appeal, somewhat artificially, rested its decision on the uncon-
46 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln County Council [1999] 2 AC 349; Lau Kong Yung v Director of Im-
migration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300 at 326; National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 4 
All ER 209 at 225.
47 National Westminister Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680.
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vincing basis that Article 160 applied only to legislation and not judicial 
decision.48 The Court of Appeal’s reasoning is far more convincing.
Without deciding if such a power exists, Li CJ provided a helpful sum-
mary of the exercise of such power. He held that (1) if such a power exists, 
it is an extraordinary power that the court would approach its exercise with 
the greatest circumspection; (2) whether this power exists depends on the 
particular constitutional framework of the jurisdiction concerned, and there 
may not be a common approach across the common law world; (3) the 
existence and scope of such power may vary in different situations, as the 
same considerations do not apply to all situations in the different context 
of private law, criminal law or public law; (4) the existence of the power 
may also be dependent on the range of remedies that may be available; and 
(5) common law is developed by an evolutionary process and such develop-
ment cannot be regarded as an application of the power to prospectively 
overrule.49 
Temporary Validity v Suspension
In the Koo Sze Yiu case, the Court of Final Appeal drew a distinction be-
tween a temporary validity order and suspension of a declaration, and 
emphasised that the level of necessity required for suspension was sub-
stantially lower than that required for a temporary validity order. This is 
a doubtful proposition. Be it a temporary validity order or suspension, the 
practical result is the same that an otherwise unconstitutional legislative 
provision is allowed to continue to operate, albeit for a definite period of 
time. In both cases this can only be justified on very compelling grounds. 
Thus, it would be difficult to find, conceptually and practically, what dif-
ference there would be between a temporary validity order and suspension. 
The suggestion, which the Court of Final Appeal appeared to make, that a 
temporary validity order should be reserved for the more extreme cases such 
48 HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614 at 629–630, paras 7–14. The court held that the 
phrase “shall be amended or cease to have force” once the pre-1997 law was found to be in contra-
vention of the Basic Law suggested that Art 160 applied only to legislative process. This begs the 
question of how the inconsistency was found in the first place. In most cases the inconsistency is 
discovered only in the judicial process and it is strange that Art 160 would not apply to the most 
usual situations where inconsistency is found. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning is far more con-
vincing. If Art 160 mandates prospective overruling, it creates an illogical distinction between pre-
1997 and post-1997 laws. In any event, most legislative provisions that are inconsistent with the 
Basic Law will also be inconsistent with the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong, and will be repealed 
by the Bill of Rights Ordinance (if it was enacted before 1991) or prevented from coming into 
force by the Letters Patent (if it was enacted after 1991). In either case, such impugned statutory 
provision would not form part of the pre-1997 laws and would not be adopted in the HKSAR. 
49 HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614 at 634.
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as when there is a virtual legal vacuum, is difficult to sustain in practice, 
given that both a temporary validity order or suspension could only apply in 
very exceptional circumstances in the first place. How exceptional should 
the exceptional circumstances be before it is justified to sail from suspension 
to a temporary validity order? It is more likely that they are just different 
ways of putting the same idea.50 
The court suggested that a temporary validity order shields the executive 
from legal liability while acting under the unconstitutional law, whereas the 
executive has no such shield under a suspension. While such a distinction 
is arguably valid in theory, it is of doubtful practical value. In the context 
of covert surveillance, most people under surveillance would not be able to 
find out that they have been subject to such surveillance, let alone to bring-
ing an action for damages or injunction. Injunctive relief is unlikely to be 
available, as an injunction is contrary to the grant of a stay of declaration 
in the first place. The only other possible remedy is a claim for damages, 
but why should the Government be liable for substantial compensation for 
doing something that the court is prepared to tolerate on strong public in-
terest ground?51 Therefore, in all cases where a court is prepared to suspend 
its declaration of unconstitutionality, any damages, if available, would likely 
be nominal only.
As the power should only be exercised in the most extraordinary 
circumstances, it is doubtful if the circumstances of this case justified a tem-
porary validity order or suspension. The Government knew full well that 
section 33 was unconstitutional at least since the Bill of Rights came into 
force in 1991. A private member bill amending section 33 was successfully 
introduced on 27 June 1997, and the amendment would come into effect 
on a day to be appointed by the Chief Executive, who failed to appoint 
an operation date after seven years. It was only when the District Court 
declared inadmissible certain evidence obtained from covert surveillance 
that the Government was finally moved to action. Even so, it refused to 
bring the amended legislation into force or to introduce new legislation; 
instead, it introduced an Executive Order. In such circumstances, if the law 
enforcement agencies were put in a difficult position to detect and inves-
tigate crimes, the Government has only had itself to blame. Besides, even 
if section 33 and the Executive Order were declared unconstitutional, the 
Government could easily bring the 1997 amendments into force. The fact 
50 Professor Peter Hogg took the same view that temporary validity was synonymous with suspension: 
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Carswell, 5th edn, 2007), vol 2, para 37.1(d). Pro-
fessor Kent Roach regarded delayed declarations of invalidity as a form of prospective overruling: 
Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Canadian Law Books Co, 2008). 
51 See also Po Jen Yap, “Constitutional Review under the Basic Law: The Rise, Retreat and Resur-
gence of Judicial Power in Hong Kong” (2007) 37(2) HKLJ 449 at 470–471.
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that the Government did not like the 1997 amendments would not be a 
sufficient ground to suspend a declaration that section 33 and the Executive 
Order were unconstitutional.
Remedies and Third Parties
Whether a remedy should be granted or refused in judicial review when 
third parties are involved is always a difficult question. It is probably not 
controversial that the effect on third parties is always a relevant consider-
ation for the court in exercising its discretion to grant or refuse remedies.52 
The more difficult question is when the court can grant remedy, including 
damages, against a third party in judicial review proceedings.
This issue arose in Harvest Good Development Ltd v Secretary for Justice.53 
The second and third respondents were squatters who claimed a title to 
the applicant’s land by adverse possession. After the Court of Final Appeal 
has decided in favour of the squatters,54 the applicant commenced judicial 
review proceedings against the Secretary for Justice on the basis that the 
statutory provisions allowing the respondents to acquire a title against the 
applicant contravened the principle against deprivation of property with-
out compensation in Article 105 of the Basic Law. The second and third 
respondents were joined as interested parties in the judicial review proceed-
ings. It was argued that in order to protect rights under the Basic Law, if 
the only effective remedy is an award against a directly affected third party 
rather than the public body whose decision is impugned, then this should 
be encompassed by judicial review if it is just and convenient to do so. Ac-
cordingly, it argued that if the applicant were successful in their judicial 
review application, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to make an order 
of damages against the second and third respondents in light of the wind-
fall they had enjoyed in acquiring a title to the land in question for free. 
In an application for setting aside leave granted against them, the second 
and third respondents argued, inter alia, that damages could not be claimed 
against them in public law proceedings. Hartmann J found the applicant’s 
argument prima facie arguable, but he considered it unnecessary to decide 
the point and acceded to the application for setting aside leave on the 
ground of an abuse of process.55
52 Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd v Chief Executive in Council [2003] 3 HKLRD 960.
53 HCAL 32/2008, 19 December 2006.
54 Chan Tin Shi & Others v Li Ting Sung & Others [2006] 1 HKLRD 185.
55 HCAL 32/2006 (19 Dec 2006), paras 66–68.
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There seems to be neither legal principle nor valid policy reason to deny 
the award of damages against private persons in public law proceedings. An 
injunction may be granted in judicial review proceedings against a private 
person who is an intervenor or is properly joined as a party because he has a 
direct interest in the matter. In R v Secretary of State for Health and Norgine 
Ltd Ex parte Scotia Pharmaceuticals Ltd (No 1), where a pharmaceutical com-
pany sought an order against the company to whom it alleged that a licence 
had been unlawfully granted, the court held that an order corresponding 
to the order which was sought against the public body could be granted 
against the private company, which had intervened and become a party to 
the proceeding.56 Evans LJ said:57
“What is said, secondly, is that there can be no order against Norgine by refer-
ence to the decision in Siskina [1979] AC 210, because the plaintiffs do not 
have or at least assert any cause of action against Norgine. On the other hand, 
that submission to my mind has an air of unreality about it when it is Norgine 
who have sought to become a party to these proceedings, yet they now assert 
that no order should be made against them in the proceedings to which they 
have become, on their own volition, a party. It seems to me also a relevant 
consideration that what is sought essentially against Norgine is at most what I 
would call a corresponding order, that is to say an order corresponding to the 
order which is sought against the Department as the first respondent. I would, 
if necessary, be prepared to hold that, by virtue of their status as a party to these 
proceedings, the applicants would be entitled to an order, if otherwise justified, 
against Norgine, notwithstanding Siskina.”
In R v Medicines Control Agency Ex parte Smith and Nephew Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd (Primecrown Ltd as interested party), the court assumed that an order of 
injunction may be granted against a third party intervenor.58
The court’s power to make an order against a private person in judicial 
review is not limited to those cases when the private person intervenes as 
a party. The test is rather whether it is just and convenient to do so. In R v 
The Licensing Authority Established by the Medicines Act 1968 Ex parte Rhone 
Poulenc Rorer Ltd and May & Baker Ltd, Laws J held:59
“There is no requirement that an applicant for an injunction must show a pri-
vate cause of action against his respondent, nor, given the nature of the judicial 
56 [1997] European Law Reports 625.
57 Ibid, at 645H-646C.
58 [1997] European Law Reports 657, at 659C–660C and 664B–H.
59 [1998] European Law Reports 127 at 142F.
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review jurisdiction, could there be. Nor is there any rule that an injunction in 
judicial review may be granted only against the public body whose decision is 
impugned; a third party, such as the importers in this case, who are ‘directly 
affected’ within RSC Order 53, rule 5(3), may be enjoined if it is just and con-
venient to do so.”
These authorities show that, where a decision of a public body is challenged 
by way of judicial review, an interim order may be made against the public 
body as well as against a private person who is benefiting from the deci-
sion of the public body. Such an order may be granted whether the private 
person is made a party to the claim or is joined as a person directly affected. 
There is no good reason why this principle should be confined to an order 
of injunction. It is accepted that the question of damages in public law is 
a controversial subject, and the prevailing approach is to deny any claim 
for damages in the absence of fraud, abuse of power, malice, bad faith or 
improper purpose.60 This seems to be an exceedingly restrictive approach. 
Given that administrative decisions in a modern administrative state could 
have far-reaching impact on the lives or well-being of an individual, the 
relevance of the conventional wisdom in maintaining a relatively restric-
tive approach to damages, which was developed at the time of a relatively 
simple society with few state or quasi-state organs exercising administra-
tive powers, is at least questionable.61 If damages are the most effective or 
the only available remedy to protect rights under the Basic Law, there is 
no good reason why that should not be made available against the private 
persons as against the State, as long as it is just and convenient to do so. As 
damages against the third party are premised on a breach on the part of the 
public bodies, such damages may perhaps be granted only as a correspond-
ing order the scope of which will be dictated by the order against the public 
bodies.
60 For an example of this approach, see Three Rivers District Council v The Governors and Company of 
the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1; Yuen Kun Yeu v Att Gen of Hong Kong [1988] 1 AC 175 
at 198D, per Lord Keith; Cheng Chung Kiang (transliteration) v Securities and Futures Commission, 
CACV 236 of 202, para 17; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at 739, per 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Tang Nin Mun v Secretary for Justice [2000] 2 HKLRD 324. See also Wade 
and Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 9th edn, 2004), p 787, and G. Ganz, 
“Public Law and the Duty of Care” [1977] Public Law 306 at 309.
61 The Law Commission in England and Wales is consulting the public on this very issue. The Law 
Commissioner proposed that the court should be provided with a discretion to award damages as 
an ancillary remedy in judicial review under certain circumstances: Law Commission Consultation 
Paper 187: Public Bodies and the Citizen (2008). The consultation period ended on 7 November 
2008.
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Epilogue
A great strength of judicial review procedure lies in its simplicity. There are 
no elaborate interlocutory procedures, and the approach of the courts to 
minimise technical arguments and to determine issues on merits has much 
to be commended. At the same time, traditional prerogative remedies in 
judicial review may not address the real issues in judicial review when the 
dispute is not really about the vires of an administrative decision or order, 
or not even between the applicant and the public body concerned as such 
(eg when the mistake or breach of duty of the public body is not the direct 
or sole cause of the applicant’s loss). The introduction of constitutional 
review presents further challenges to the court, and declaratory relief is a 
powerful tool in the hands of the judiciary to balance competing interests. 
It is encouraging that the judiciary has responded to this challenge with in-
novation and flexibility. At the same time, as the court in Hung Chan Wa 
remarked, how declaratory relief is to further develop may depend on the 
constitutional framework of different jurisdictions, and this may be an area 
where common law may develop in different directions whilst sharing the 
same root. In this regard, it may be worthwhile to bear in mind the observa-
tions of Lord Nicholls in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd:62
“Rigidity in the operation of a legal system is a sign of weakness, not strength. 
It deprives a legal system of necessary elasticity. Far from achieving a consti-
tutionally exemplary result, it can produce a legal system unable to function 
effectively in changing times. ‘Never say never’ is a wise judicial precept, in the 
interest of all citizens of the country.”
62 [2005] 2 AC 680 at 699.
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